The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in There are a wide variety of devices available for nonlethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. He fled but she caught him. Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. Hyde v. Bowman et al. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. Dockets & Filings. Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) -Similar decision to Scott v. Harris - firing 15 shots into a vehicle/the presence of a passenger did not amount to excessive force. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. 1994), and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. The alternatives here were three. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. Justia. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. She did not have her night stick. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. The details matter here, so we recite them. Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him, Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. 1993 . Plakas often repeated these thoughts. right of "armed robbery. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. 8. He moved toward her. The answer is no. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. The alternatives here were three. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Before CUMMINGS and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and ZAGEL, District Judge.*. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Appx. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. 1988). He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. ", (bike or scooter) w/3 (injury or 2. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. 3. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. (Notes) Sherrod v. He fled but she caught him. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. 2d 1116 (1976). 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (1977). Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. Plakas turned and faced them. McGarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Lincoln, et al. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. He appeared to be blacking out. Drinski did most of the talking. Find . Id. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Plakas V. Drinski. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. 1988) (en banc) . He tried to avoid violence. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one Conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1148; Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 151 F.3d at 1318-19. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . He swore Koby would not touch him. 93-1431. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). at 1276, n. 8. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources . Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. App. It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Again, he struck her. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. 3. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike.
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